Security models for trusting network appliances by English, Colin et al.
Strathprints Institutional Repository
English, C. and Nixon, P. and Terzis, S. and McGettrick, A. and Lowe, H. (2002) Security models
for trusting network appliances. In: 5th IEEE International Workshop on Networked Appliances,
2002-10-30 - 2002-10-31, Liverpool.
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
 
 
 
English, C. and Nixon, P. and Terzis, S. and McGettrick, A. and Lowe, H. 
(2002) Security models for trusting network appliances. In: 5th IEEE 
International Workshop on Networked Appliances, 30-31 Oct 2002, 
Liverpool, United Kingdom.
 
 
 
http://eprints.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/2516/
 
 
 
This is an author-produced version of a presentation from the 5th IEEE 
International Workshop on Networked Appliances.
This version has been peer-reviewed, but does not include the 
final publisher proof corrections, published layout, or pagination. 
 
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research 
output of the University of Strathclyde. Copyright © and Moral 
Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download 
and/or print one copy of any article(s) in Strathprints to facilitate 
their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not 
engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely 
distribute the url (http://eprints.cdlr.strath.ac.uk) of the Strathprints 
website. 
 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to The 
Strathprints Administrator: eprints@cis.strath.ac.uk 
 
Security Models for Trusting Network Appliances 
 
 
Colin English, Paddy Nixon, Sotirios Terzis, 
Andrew McGettrick and Helen Lowe 
Department of Computer and Information Sciences 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland. 
Colin.English@cis.strath.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A significant characteristic of pervasive computing is 
the need for secure interactions between highly mobile 
entities and the services in their environment. Moreover, 
these decentralised systems are also characterised by 
partial views over the state of the global environment, 
implying that we cannot guarantee verification of the 
properties of the mobile entity entering an unfamiliar 
domain. Secure in this context encompasses both the need 
for cryptographic security and the need for trust, on the 
part of both parties, that the interaction is functioning as 
expected. In this paper we make a broad assumption that 
trust and cryptographic security can be considered as 
orthogonal concerns (i.e. cryptographic measures do not 
ensure transmission of correct information). We assume 
the existence of reliable encryption techniques and focus 
on the characteristics of a model that supports the 
management of the trust relationships between two 
devices during ad-hoc interactions. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Ubiquitous and pervasive computing premises a 
massively networked world supporting a population of 
diverse but cooperating mobile entities [1], ranging from 
mobile computational agents to mobile devices such as 
handheld PDAs and mobile phones. Many of these 
devices stand to benefit from the ability to interact and co-
operate with other entities and services, whether static or 
mobile, to allow successful execution of allocated tasks 
even in unfamiliar surroundings. The capability of PDAs 
to form an ad-hoc connection to a network printer on an 
unfamiliar LAN is an example of this. Within such an 
infrastructure with highly dynamic and unpredictable 
characteristics and composition, autonomous operation is 
necessary due to lack of central control. Entities will have 
to deal with unforeseen circumstances ranging from 
unexpected interactions to disconnected operation with 
incomplete information about the environment. Security 
plays an important role in this infrastructure, as the risks 
inherent in interacting with services and other mobile 
entities are many and varied. 
 
The infrastructure that supports this pervasive 
computing system introduces new security challenges not 
addressed in existing security models, including in the 
domain of trust management. Humans use trust as a means 
to reason about and accept risk in situations of partial 
information and assign privileges accordingly. It is 
therefore reasonable to consider trust as a mechanism to 
facilitate interaction between mobile devices and the 
facilities within the environment. Trust is subjective [2], 
being a personal opinion based primarily on first hand 
observations or carefully considered advice from others if 
available, allowing decisions to be made with only partial 
knowledge. Trust is also situation specific [2] in its nature, 
as an individual’s opinions are based on observations in a 
particular environment. Trust in one environment does not 
necessarily transfer to another environment and as a result, 
a notion of context is necessary [3]. It is also a highly 
dynamic phenomenon, which evolves dependent on new 
evidence as it becomes available. These factors, while 
providing great flexibility, make it very difficult to form a 
definition incorporating all views and types of trust 
identified by humans [4, 5]. 
 
2 Current Trust Management 
 
Matt Blaze et al. [6] define trust management as “a 
unified approach to specifying and interpreting security 
policies, credentials and relationships that allow direct 
authorisation of security-critical actions” In such trust 
management systems, trust is viewed implicitly through 
the delegation of privileges to trusted entities via the use 
of credentials or certificates, which can be chained to 
represent recommendations and the propagation of trust 
between entities [7]. This implicit coarse view of trust 
fails to capture the many intricacies of trust as intuitively 
viewed by humans. Many of these aspects are essential for 
a trust model that must operate without central control, to 
allow security decisions to be made by autonomous 
entities or devices in situations where no specific security 
infrastructure can be relied upon. 
 
Although current trust management systems as defined 
above provide many useful and valid insights, the lack of 
explicit trust evaluation precludes many of the aspects 
deemed necessary for autonomous entities to reason about 
trust for flexible security paradigms. In the systems 
considered here, these approaches fail on a number of 
other important, general points. Firstly, many rely on 
complete information, where only partial information may 
be available, as requests can come from unknown entities 
or environments may be unfamiliar or hostile. Secondly, 
mobile entities are likely to become disconnected from 
their home network and must be able to make security 
decisions without relying on a specific security 
infrastructure or certification authority. The user or some 
central authority such as the system administrator 
currently often decides which entities are trustworthy and 
as a result, entities cannot dynamically reconfigure 
themselves to cope with unforeseen circumstances or 
requests for service from unknown devices entering their 
administrative domain. Thirdly, the dynamic aspects of 
trust formation, evolution and exploitation, which are 
central to human intuition of the phenomenon, are largely 
neglected in current systems [6], [8], [9]. Formation of 
implicit trust relationships generally requires some form 
of prior configuration, which may be impossible in 
situations where the device is disconnected from its home 
network. Most attempts at evolution are based around 
certificate revocation, which is a very negative and coarse 
view, making the choosing between alternative 
collaborators difficult via implicit trust representation. 
 
These issues must be resolved to be able to assign 
meaningful privileges and facilitate interaction between 
devices in such a complex world and bring tremendous 
potential for new services. The aim of this work is to help 
create a user-intuitive Information Society where people 
have confidence in the systems they use everyday, by 
removing the need for the user to consider or even 
understand the security implications of actions they take 
or have taken on their behalf. The lack of trust in current 
security mechanisms is evident in the reluctance to accept 
e-commerce, fuelled by a number of publicised attacks 
exposing weaknesses that need addressed before users will 
adopt services provided by these systems. 
 
The view taken here is that the ability to form and 
evolve explicit values for trust in other principles in an 
interaction allows autonomous computational entities 
within devices to make better decisions on the user’s 
behalf in situations where only partial information is 
available. 
 
3 Adopted Approach 
 
3.1 Objectives 
 
• Facilitate the ad-hoc interaction of unknown 
autonomous devices in situations of partial 
information by the definition of a trust model 
sufficiently detailed to allow entities to reason 
about and compare the trustworthiness of other 
entities for security related decisions. 
• Capture the dynamic aspects of trust formation 
and trust evolution with fine granularity. 
• The model must capture human intuitions about 
trust to ensure understanding, thus reducing 
security vulnerabilities in implementations. 
 
3.2 Characteristics of the Trust Model 
 
Ad-hoc interaction between mutually unknown entities 
can take place only if there is an adequate level of trust 
between the parties. As mentioned above, the implicit, 
coarse and static view of trust in current systems fails to 
model the notion of trust, as human intuition understands 
it. A dynamic model of trust will provide devices with the 
ability to operate and make security related decisions 
autonomously. While trust defies stringent definition, it is 
proposed that a model with explicit trust values can be 
realised in sufficient detail to be used either to augment 
other security mechanisms or as a basis for unencrypted 
interactions. With a range of explicit values representing 
trust, a finer granularity of representation is achieved, 
providing entities with enhanced information on which to 
base decisions. Values may also be stored in memory, to 
represent historical information on the behavioural 
patterns of specific entities. It is also proposed that in 
situations where a task must be carried out by the ‘best of 
a bad bunch’, finer granularity of trust representation will 
facilitate comparisons between entities. 
 
There are three main sources of trust information about 
another entity. Personal observations of the entity’s 
behaviour are essential for the subjective evaluation of 
trustworthiness; therefore the outcome of interactions is 
recorded and made available as evidence to all principals. 
Recommendations from trusted third parties provide the 
possibility for trust to be propagated between unknown 
entities in a similar manner to the deferment of trust as 
seen in current trust models. The reputation of an entity 
can be consulted in the absence of experience or 
recommendation, in effect, acting as an anonymous 
recommendation. Further information on which to base 
trusting decisions can be extracted from the environment 
or domain in which the entity is operating and thus a 
notion of context is necessary to incorporate the 
situational nature of trust. A strong basis for trust is 
established through an entity’s subjective observations 
and the collection of such evidence, although exactly what 
properties of the interaction should be recorded and how 
must be established. A means of recognition should be 
included, together with trust values, entity state before and 
after the encounter, desired state after the encounter and 
some notion of context. Recommendations may take the 
form of signed credentials or evidence to be evaluated 
subjectively within an environment similar to the context 
of the recommendation. 
 
A downfall of most access control mechanisms on the 
Internet is the reliance on authenticated identity of the 
principal involved to provide access control. In the types 
of systems in the GCI vision, it may be impossible to 
establish the identity of unknown entities. Even when 
identity can be established, for example via intersecting 
certificate hierarchies in PKI [11], this conveys no a 
priori information about the likely behaviour of an entity. 
It is therefore proposed that all participants be assumed 
virtually anonymous, with consideration given to 
recognition of entities rather than identity. In this way, the 
necessity for prior configuration of collaborative entities 
is removed, allowing unforeseen circumstances to be dealt 
with as they arise. Auto-configuration measures must 
therefore be in place to remove the reliance on centralised 
certification authorities and allow the formation of an 
initial level of trust when entities meet for the first time, 
even when devices roaming between administrative 
domains may be disconnected from their home network. 
 
3.3 Dynamic Aspects of the Model 
 
The dynamic aspects of how trust is formed, how trust 
evolves over time due to available information and how 
trust can be exploited are collectively referred to as the 
trust lifecycle. A model of trust incorporating the lifecycle 
will provide an entity with the ability to reason about and 
make security related decisions autonomously. With a 
range of explicit values representing trust, a finer 
granularity of representation is achieved, providing 
entities with enhanced information on which to base 
decisions. The temporal aspect of memory must be 
addressed if trust is to be modelled realistically with a 
sense of history. Trust information or values may be 
stored in memory, to represent historical information on 
the behavioural patterns of specific entities. Before any 
new interaction an entity will choose what fraction of its 
past to reveal, affecting the awareness and predictability 
of dishonest behaviour, based on patterns in the available 
evidence. This dynamic view of trust will result in a more 
flexible model able to represent trust in a manner that 
captures human intuitions, such that positive outcomes of 
interactions will preserve or amplify trust, while trust 
erodes without periodic interactions or recommendations. 
 
3.3.1 Trust Formation. The process of establishing the 
initial trustworthiness of each collaborator is referred to as 
trust formation. A summary of an entity's trustworthiness 
can be synthesized from the history of its past interactions 
to be used by other entities when allocating privileges 
with specific risks. Evidence relevant to the current 
context will carry the most weight, in particular subjective 
observations made by the entity itself about previous 
interactions. Initially new entities have no evidence of past 
behaviour to establish a base for interaction. To form an 
opinion of trustworthiness in this case requires the 
presence of some optimistic entities willing to take risks in 
unknown situations, allocating privileges judiciously until 
experience shows that it was unwise. 
 
Recommendations may be used to establish 
collaboration between entities that have never met, but 
who trust a common third party. Recommendation chains 
can be used as a recursive version of this principle. 
Recommendation and reputation concepts are similar to 
the concept of the web of trust in the literature, except that 
all aspects of trust are dealt with in this way. Reputation 
can be consulted in the absence of experience or 
recommendation. 
 
3.3.2 Trust Evolution. The evolution process can be 
regarded as iterating the process of trust formation as 
additional evidence becomes available. Accumulation of 
evidence with experience of new interactions must modify 
the level of trust to be placed in an entity, incrementing 
the summary information to maintain accuracy. The risk 
assessment for an entity performing an action in a 
particular context will change depending on how much is 
known about positively or negatively perceived actions in 
the past. A successful high-risk interaction results in 
greater increase of trust than a successful low risk 
interaction. Conversely, the lower the level of risk, the 
greater is the penalty for a failed interaction. 
 
This granularity of evolution is seen to be necessary 
when Byzantine behaviour is considered. The reason for a 
failure may be more important than the fact that the failure 
occurred. Most people would alter their level of trust in 
another more radically if a failure were intentional and 
malicious rather than accidental. Using historical 
information, patterns in previous behaviour may be 
analysed to help determine the reason behind failure. The 
only evidence of the outcome of interactions may be from 
dishonest sources, requiring measures to be in place to 
modify the reputation of certificate signatories and 
collaborators in cases of framing or collusion. 
 
3.3.3 Trust Exploitation. The essential problem in 
exploitation is to determine behaviour on the basis of 
trust, which balances risk and benefit within the context 
appropriately. Trustworthiness is interpreted through 
historical information before deciding to interact with 
another entity, with evidence relevant to the current 
context carrying the most weight. The risk assessment for 
an entity performing an action in a particular context will 
also change depending on how much is known about 
positively or negatively perceived actions in the past. 
 
Security policy for granting requests is expressed in 
terms of trust and specifies the level of positive 
experiences required to allow access to a specific resource 
or service. If we consider trust as a mechanism for 
expressing the amount of risk an entity will accept in a 
particular context, the entity must evaluate the level and 
type of risk associated with the context. Policy will 
determine whether an entity is optimistic or pessimistic 
about an interaction depending on the scale of the adverse 
consequences associated with the risks. An optimistic 
approach is appropriate when the risks are commensurate 
with the possible benefits, while a pessimistic one is likely 
to be adopted whenever the potential risk is high. 
Optimistic behaviour allows new entities to take the first 
steps towards establishing their trustworthiness. 
Pessimistic behaviour is essential when a great deal is at 
risk; we must be sure of past good behaviour in similar 
contexts. 
 
4 Status and Open Issues 
 
As part of the SECURE project an initial formal trust 
model is being developed which addresses some of the 
issues that arise in using trust as part of a security 
mechanism, such as the representation of trust and of 
recorded evidence. The model will help determine exactly 
where the importance of context lies, what constitutes the 
context and how context-awareness can be achieved. 
Similarly, the model being developed will also lead to a 
better understanding of how to confer privileges based on 
trust. The formal trust model is being developed based on 
a lattice of trust values, using the trust policies of an entity 
as functions for least fixed-point calculations. The model 
currently uses trust delegation rather than 
recommendations, and it is in the early stages of 
development. 
 
A risk model is also being developed, considering the 
interaction between trust and risk, the properties of which 
are uncertain at present. It is unclear whether the fact that 
a particular entity is trusted affects the perception of risk 
or affects the willingness to accept risk in an interaction 
with that entity. Currently the assumption is the former 
perceptive notion, where willingness to accept risk is 
captured by some utility function, although this decision 
may be reconsidered as the model is developed further. 
Whether trust values can be incorporated into the risk 
model in both ways remains to be seen, although it seems 
that this is likely to introduce issues of double counting of 
trust values, resulting in unrealistic trusting decisions 
being made. Other current assumptions are that for a 
specific action, all outcomes are known and the costs or 
benefits associated with each one can be calculated. 
 
 Entity recognition is being addressed within SECURE 
through the use of a pluggable recognition module. The 
mechanism being developed should have two important 
properties. Firstly, a change of identity will be possible, 
but is discouraged by the penalty of loss of past history 
and privileges and secondly, spoofing of identities should 
not be possible. 
 
Our priority is currently the development of a model of 
the dynamic aspects of the trust lifecycle, to determine the 
feasibility of such an approach and examine the issues of 
evidence collection and use in the formation, evolution 
and exploitation of trust values. The concepts of 
recommendation and reputation will be studied to 
determine how these can be best represented. Studying the 
dynamic aspects introduces the concept of time and 
memory to the trust model; therefore these aspects must 
be examined in relation to the evidence stored on trust 
from previous interactions, enhancing the awareness and 
predictability of dishonest behaviour. Issues of the exact 
scope of trust within the model will have to be addressed. 
It is envisaged that these insights will allow the 
development of a trust based security model for mobile 
entities, where risk is a central component, and a 
supporting lifecycle management system for such 
interactions. 
 
The investigation of how to model and combine the 
three forms of trust evidence are important as the 
scalability of the system is affected by the decision on 
how to represent the information gained from an 
interaction. Evidence based on personal observations 
clearly has more value than that from other sources, but 
evidence available from other entities is also important 
and can be passed as a recommendation, for subjective 
evaluation when, for example, they have vastly more 
experience than you. Reputation is less important in that it 
is less reliable than the other forms of evidence. It may be 
represented in various ways, being weaker by conveyance 
of less information or information source anonymity. This 
could mean that only the trust value is passed rather than 
the evidence, or that the information is an amalgamation 
of recommendations received and passed on by an entity 
with no experience of its own. Our work in this area 
contemplates a similar approach to the work of Catholijn 
Jonker and Jan Treur [12], using sequences of positive or 
negative past experiences of various degrees to evolve 
trust from all previous experience, or update an existing 
value. In the initial stages, we assume the absence of 
Byzantine behaviour and non-cooperative scenarios and 
leave these for longer-term future work. 
 
We are developing a simulation framework, where 
entities are represented by agents, for the investigation of 
trust lifecycle issues. The model will be tested using 
simulations rather than implementation scenarios, as this 
allows control over independent variables and a range of 
complex behaviours to be studied. We are unlikely to be 
able to run “real-life” experiments of more than a few 
cases even if these were desirable in the first instance. In 
real life we cannot control independent variables so 
failure (of our model to live up to expectations) would tell 
us little. Also, we could only test very benign scenarios 
where no one was really going to get hurt as a result of 
their behaviour. Simulation is, therefore, an important 
weapon in our armoury. The simulations will test the 
applicability and scalability of all aspects of the model 
and address issues such as the auto-configuration 
mechanism and methods for entity recognition. It may be 
possible to examine the correctness of assumptions such 
as agents always behave in a rational manner and examine 
the effects on the system when such assumptions are 
removed. Work started with an implementation of two 
specific scenarios, an agent-based file sharing facility and 
trust based dynamic routing in ad-hoc networks, which we 
are now generalizing to produce the simulation 
framework. It is also hoped that privacy implications of 
displaying historical information will become clearer 
through these investigations. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Traditional hard coded security models lack the 
flexibility to be of use in pervasive systems consisting of 
ad-hoc interactions between autonomous mobile devices, 
where only incomplete information is available on which 
to base security decisions. A weaker, but more flexible 
model is the application of trust based security models to 
cope with the risk inherent in interactions in this 
environment. Current trust management solutions fail to 
capture the notion of trust and its relation to risk in a 
manner suited to these systems with no form of central 
control. The requirement for pre-configured trust 
information highlights the lack of flexibility. This paper 
discusses the characteristics necessary to provide a basis 
for reasoning about trust in security related decisions for 
these systems. Although it is clear there are many open 
issues, these will only be fully determined by the 
continuing work, which is expected to address these 
problems. 
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